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Why Does a Woman’s Deliberative Faculty Have No Authority? 
Aristotle on the Political Role of Women
Abstract   In this paper I will discuss Aristotle’s controversial philosophical 
views on women. I will critically examine three main interpretations of his 
claim that women have deliberative faculty “without authority”. According to 
the first line of interpretation, Aristotle has in mind that women’s incapacity 
of advice-giving and decision-making in public affairs are determined by con-
ventions in the political context of his time. I will attempt to point out the 
disadvantages of this kind of interpretation. Furthermore, I will put forward 
the reasons why is implausible the more recent interpretation, given by Mar-
guerite Deslauriers. According to her reading, the lack of authority of delib-
erative faculty in women means nothing else than the tasks over which women 
have authority are for the purpose of the tasks put forth by men. The prevail-
ing interpretation among scholars is that, in Aristotle’s view, women are 
naturally inferior to men, due to the fact that they are all too frequently over-
ruled by the irrational “forces” of their nature. I will argue that this line of 
interpretation elucidates what Aristotle presumably has in mind, although it 
makes his account of women and their rationality, if not inconclusive, then 
indisputably problematic. In other words, I attempt to prove that, if the pre-
vailing line of interpretation is correct, such view of women produces some 
philosophically “insurmountable” problems for Aristotle. The aim of the last 
section of the paper is to point out how some of these problems could eventually 
be resolved.
Keywords: Aristotle, women, deliberative faculty, decision-making, authority
1. Introduction
Unlike the sophists, Socrates and Plato, Aristotle’s views on women could 
be characterized both as traditional and conservativeͱ. What makes them 
philosophically interesting and challenging is the fact that he did not accept 
the traditional role of slaves and women for granted, but he provided the 
explanations for his views. Although it was generally accepted in Greece 
of Aristotle’s time that women should have neither deliberative nor polit-
ical function in the polis, he considered that this thesis ought to be sup-
ported by a reasonable explanation. Additionally, women did not play, as 
1  This paper was written within the projects 179064 and 179067, financed by the Min-
istry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
UDK: 141-055.2  FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO XXVI (4), 2015.
DOI: 10.2298/FID1504902D
Original scientific article
Received: 4.11.2015 — Accepted: 2.12.2015
IRINA DERETIĆ: Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philo-
sophy, University of Belgrade. She is head of the project “History of Serbian Philosophy”, sup-
ported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic 
of Serbia.
903
  STUDIES AND ARTICLES
we all know, any political role in the ancient Greek society. Aristotle did 
think that this was a valid thesis, giving reasons for such a belief.
The aim of this paper is not to criticize Aristotle’s beliefs from the con-
temporary, feministic perspective,Ͳ but to reconstruct and critically 
evaluate his views of the social and political role of women, taking into 
account the conceptual framework of his philosophy. I will focus on a 
much-discussed Aristotelian claim on women’s deliberative capacity lack-
ing in authority. There are three main interpretations of this thesis, which 
will be critically discussed. According to the first line of interpretation, 
Aristotle has in mind that women’s inability of advice-giving and de-
cision-making in public affairs is by convention in the political context 
of his time. Aristotle evidently shared the prevailing opinion of his time 
about women’s inferiority, but I will attempt to prove that the customs 
of his time were not sufficient validation for his claim that women’s de-
liberative faculty lacks authority. Furthermore, I will put forward the 
reasons why the more recent interpretation, given by Marguerite Deslau-
riers, is implausible. According to her, the lack of authority of deliberative 
faculty in women means nothing else than the tasks over which women 
have authority are for the purpose of the tasks of men. The prevailing 
interpretation among scholars is that, in Aristotle’s view, women are 
naturally inferior to men, due to the fact that they are all too frequently 
overruled by the irrational “forces” of their nature. I will argue that this 
line of interpretation elucidates what Aristotle presumably has in mind, 
although it makes his account of women and their rationality, if not in-
conclusive, then indisputably problematic. I will also attempt to prove 
that, although the prevailing line of interpret ation may be correct, such a 
view of women produces some almost philo sophically “insurmountable” 
problems to Aristotle. The aim of the last section of the paper is to point 
out how eventually some of these problems could be solved.
2.  The Central Biological Difference 
between the Male and the Female 
and its Ethical Implications
Briefly speaking, in his Generation of Animals (GA 765b9–15), Aristotle 
draws two central differences between the sexes in the generation of off-
spring. First, the male has full capacity to concoct the semen, due to the 
amount of its vital heat, and to emit it outside his body, whereas the 
2  There are some very insightful papers on Aristotle’s philosophy from the feminist 
perspective. See particularly: Freeland 1998 and Witt 2005.
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female’s catamenia, which can be better or worse concocted, preserves 
the semen within her body. Second, the male “has the principle of the 
form” (in his soul) that “determines the shape and the functions of the 
off-spring” (Deslauriers 2009: 216), while the female contributes only the 
material to the new offspring, which is “in the substance of catamenia” 
(GA 727b31). The eidos of the future offspring is potentially in the soul 
of the male, and the semen, serving as a kind of instrument, puts “motion 
in actuality” (GA 765b21), which fundamentally influences both the shape 
and faculties of the offsprings. The ovum of the female provides merely 
the material for generation of anew individual. Aristotle’s division of the 
sexual role in generation is not without the evaluation of both sexes. Due 
to the fact that the female is “incapable of concocting the nutriment in 
its last stage into semen”, “women are”, Aristotle concludes, “impotent 
men (GA 728a 18)”. Aristotle seems to surpass the field and the language of 
science and biology by attributing the female “impotence” to the inability 
to influence any of the psychic abilities of the child.
There are different opinions among scholars about the relevance of the 
biological sexual difference (Lange 1983, Deslauriers 2009) for Aristotle’s 
account of the political roles of men and women. Biological differenti-
ation has been considered the foundation for the socio-political‚ rational 
and moral differences of the sexes. Lynda Lange (Lange 1983) seems to 
argue that Aristotle aims to ground the claims on women’s political in-
feriority on the biological differences. On the other hand, Marguerite 
Deslauriers (Deslauriers 2009) supposes that the reasons why Aristotle’s 
political sexual differences could not be explained in Aristotelian bio-
logical, conceptual framework.
In light of Politics (1260a7–14), as we will see, one may rightly draw the 
inference that there is no explicit connection between Aristotle’s bio-
logical reflections on the female’s contribution to the generation of the 
off-spring and his claims on the political role of women in the society. 
While arguing on the political role of men and women, he has in mind 
the psychological make-up, the psychological factors significant for de-
termining the political relations, rather than the biology of both sexes. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s vocabulary, used not only to describe, but also 
to evaluate the female’s biological deficiency, points out that his bio-
logical claims do not have a neutral meaning, and subsequently do have, 
albeit indirectly, socio-political implications.
I concur with Marguerite Deslauriers’ opinion that Aristotle did not in-
tend to found his political claims on biological differences (Deslauriers 
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2009: 215), but rather to ground them in the divergent psychological 
characteristics of men and women. One may, of course, argue that the 
development of the body during the embryological formation could also 
affect the psychic abilities and their functioning from perception through 
imagination to reasoning. For example, some defects of our body can 
also affect our soul.ͳ Nevertheless, due to Aristotle’s thesis of the priority 
of the soul over the body, one may claim that generally bodily character-
istics are not constitutive of psychological characteristics, that is to say, 
that the body does not determine our soul and its abilities and features. 
Moreover, the psychic features, particularly of the rational soul, are not 
reducible to a biological conceptual framework.
Evidently, Aristotle did not program his biology to be the justification 
for gender differences, neither had he in mind to establish a coherent 
philosophical account of the female gender founded in his biological 
writings. Nevertheless, there is a consistency in Aristotle concerning the 
inferiority of women from the biological through the psychological and 
to the socio-political level. From these very diverse perspectives, Aristotle 
evidently held that a woman is a deficient human being, inferior to man 
in all respects. Therefore, his evaluation of the female’s role in the process 
of natural generation fits in his overall outlook that he has about women. 
This does not mean, as some scholars did imply (Lange 1983, Okins 1979, 
etc.), that his “misogynist” reflections have implications for his philosophy 
in general, and for his metaphysics in particular.ʹ
3. The Female’s Deliberative Reason without Authority
Aristotle asserts that both men and women do not differ in species, and 
are therefore humans due to their uniquely human form (GA 731b34–
732a2, Met. 1058a29–b25). Accordingly, they must share the same moral 
characteristics and intellectual abilities that distinguish humans as ra-
tional and political animals. Nevertheless, many times in his Politics he 
states that “according to nature (φύσει)” the male is superior, and the 
female is inferior, implying, as it might seem, that women, unlike men, 
are incomplete humans. These evaluative claims on the female’s inferior-
ity have social and political consequences. Men should rule and women 
should be ruled over, i.e., women should be subjected to men in their 
social and political lives.
3  Regarding the question of the priority in Aristotle’s philosophy see Peramatzis 2012. 
4  Recently, Charlotte Witt successfully argued that “gender associations with Aris-
totelian matter and form are extrinsic to these concepts”. See Witt 2005: 5.
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There is a tendency in the contemporary literature to defend Aristotle 
from the feminist accusations, by drawing attention to the places where 
the opposite genders are not accounted for in the terms of men’s superi-
ority over women. By suggesting that Aristotle’s claims on the gender 
roles might imply that “the fullest human excellence would combine 
masculine and feminine inclinations”, (Arnhart 1994: 398) overestimates 
some passages in Aristotle’s writings where, indeed, the evaluation of the 
female and the relationship between genders are more complex and more 
friendly than it has been usually assumed. The claims for the inferiority 
of women and their subjection to men’s rule are prevailing in Aristotle, 
whether we concur with them or not, or how we judge them from a con-
temporary perspective.
Aristotle, however, does not leave his claims about the men’s supremacy 
over women unexplained. One of the justifications for his beliefs regard-
ing the different political roles of both genders and slaves may found in 
the following well-known passage:
Almost all things rule (τὰ ἄρχοντα) and are ruled (ἀρχόμενα) accord-
ing to nature (φύσει). But the free man rules the slave in a different 
way in which the male rules the female or the man the child; although 
the parts of the soul (τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς) are present in all of them, 
they are present in different ways. For the slave has no deliberative 
faculty (τὸ βουλευτικόν) at all; the woman has, but it is without 
authority (ἄκυρον), and the child has, but it is incomplete (ἀτελές). 
(Pol. 1260a7–14)
In my analysis, I will focus on the relationship between the male and the 
female, skipping the very important question of slavery, for it falls outside 
the scope of the present discussion. The ruling is strictly predisposed and 
determined “according to nature”, implying that the better should rule 
over the worse. Analogously, in the human soul the better “part” should 
rule over the “worse” one, in order for it to accomplish the complete excel-
lence. Aristotle accounts for the political or ruling legitimacy in terms of the 
ability to deliberate (τὸ βουλευτικόν). It is a disposition to arrive at correct 
moral and political judgments about what should be done in private and 
public affairs. This is also a particular kind of means-end reasoning, where 
the starting point is a good goal and the conclusion is a decision about 
what should be done here and now, in order to achieve that aim.
Unlike slaves and children, women do possess the capacity to deliberate, 
which is, however, ἄκυρον. This term can have one of two meanings: it can 
denote those who has no power or authority; or it can apply to laws or 
sentences, meaning that they are “no longer in force, cancelled, annulled, 
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or set aside” (Bradshow 1991: 564). However, it is very important to under-
stand what Aristotle here meant by the non-authoritative character of 
deliberative reason in women relative to the authoritative deliberative fac-
ulty in men. This issue is crucial for understanding Aristotle’s account of 
both the “nature” of women’s reasoning and their exclusion from political 
life, i.e., public affairs.
There are three lines of interpretation of Aristotle’s ambiguous claim that 
women’s practical rationality is “without authority”. I will argue that all 
three of them are problematic. My aim is to prove that the first and the 
third one seem to lead Aristotle to contradictions, whereas the second 
one is not supported by the textual evidence in the Politics. We cannot 
be certain as to what Aristotle has in mind, but we can at least attempt a 
reconstruction of his text.
According to the first line of interpretation, Aristotle reiterates the view, 
prevailing in Athens of his time, about the women’s faculty for delibera-
tion in public affairs. Women might accurately and correctly judge about 
moral and even political affairs, having at the same time no executive 
power to implement their judgments. If this is what Aristotle has in mind 
when he asserts that women do have τὸ βουλευτικόν, but without author-
ity, then he is stating an empirical fact, and it seems that the first line of 
interpretation is correct. Nevertheless, his claim on the inability of women 
to rule “without authority” seems to be naturalistic, since it is based on 
Aristotle’s assumptions that women are naturally inferior to men (Pol. 
1245b12, 125414–16, 1259a41). Moreover, Aristotle’s first claim in the above-
cited passage that “all things rule and are ruled according to nature” 
presupposes that women rule or are ruled “according to nature”. On the 
other hand, according to the first line of interpretation, women’s non-
authoritative deliberative faculty seems to be by conventions, i.e., by 
the opinions and customs of Athenian society of 4th century BC. Sub-
sequently, if we accept this kind of interpretation, it seems that we would 
have to accept two contradictory claims: that – women’s deliberat ive 
faculty “without authority” is “according to nature”, and that – women’s 
deliberative faculty “without authority” is according to conventions. Or, 
at least we would weaken Aristotle’s argument about women’s natural 
inability to exercise their deliberative faculty, since it lacks authority, by 
claiming that this is according to the conventions. Aristotle shared the 
prevailing opinion of his time about women’s inferiority, but I do not 
believe that these opinions and customs were sufficient justification for 
his claim of women’s deliberative faculty lacking authority.
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Recently, Marguerite Deslauriers (Deslauriers 2003: 228–229) has sug-
gested an interpretation of the thesis that women’s deliberative faculty 
lacks authority, in terms of the different functions and tasks that men 
and women exercise (NE 1162b22–3). The functions and tasks of women 
have authority in different domain. Both genders have some roles and 
authorities in the household. The duties and tasks of women are re-
stricted to the household, whereas men’s duties and tasks “extend beyond 
the household to the city” (Deslauriers 2003: 228). According to Deslauri-
ers’ interpretation of Aristotle, the polis has priority over the household, 
i.e., the household exists and functions for the purpose of the polis. 
Therefore, the ruling of the house hold is for the sake of the ruling of the 
polis, and hence is both better and choice worthy. As Deslauriers rightly 
claims, the assertion that the woman’ s faculty of deliberation is “without 
authority”, means that the deliberations and decisions of women are 
“subject to the authority of the deliberative faculty in men (Deslauriers 
2003: 229)”. In her opinion, the reason for that is that duties and tasks 
over which women have authority are restricted to the household, and 
are for the sake of the duties and tasks of men, which are performed in 
the polis. The rule of the household, which is a woman’s task, is without 
authority relative to the rule of the polis, which is a man’s task. This in-
terpretation appears consistent and conclusive. It also brings out an in-
sight that the deliberative faculty in women is not completely without 
authority, but is limited to less important and worthwhile jobs.
Yet, this interpretation produces more problems than it solves. First, if 
Aristotle had had in mind that the authority of women is relative and 
limited to the household, he would have explicitly said so or at least he 
would have had indicated it. Second, when claiming that a woman has 
a deliberative faculty, but without authority, Aristotle does not specify 
the domains in which this is the case, although the lack of a woman’s 
authority in public affairs is evident. This claim appears more like a general 
one. Third, in Aristotle’s view there is no domain in which only women 
rule, not even in the household. Apparently women only partake in ruling 
the household. Aristotle explicitly claims that if women rule in the house-
hold, it is not due to their excellence, but because of the wealth and 
power (NE 1160b38–1161a2), meaning that this kind of ruling is not prefer able. 
Consequently, women should not have exclusive authority in the house-
hold, but they share it with their husbands.
The prevailing interpretation among scholars (Fortenbaugh 1977, Modrak 
2004, Arnhart 1994) regarding the thesis that the deliberative faculty in 
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women lacks authority, is based upon certain characteristics of women’s 
nature. According to this interpretation, Aristotle’s intention here is to 
explain why women should not rule, and not simply to state the fact that 
they cannot rule in the society of his time. In other words, Aristotle 
makes an effort to justify his previously stated claim that there are natural 
rulers and natural subjects. This justification is based on the nature of 
the rulers and their subjects, implying that the nature of the former has 
to be better and superior than the nature of the latter. It seems that the 
problem with a woman’s nature is that the rational and irrational parts 
of her soul are not properly balanced, in the sense that irrational “forces” 
are often not subjected to her deliberative faculty. In other words, the 
prevailing interpretation takes it that Aristotle’s claim that the deliberative 
faculty of a woman is non-authoritative, is to be understood as follows: 
a woman’s practical reason is all too frequently overcome by the irrational 
“part” of her soul; that is to say, her deliberative faculty can easily be over-
ridden by certain irrational desires or appetites, thus preventing her from 
making reasonable decisions in public affairs.
As we can see, according to this line of interpretation Aristotle’s contro-
versial and ambiguous claim should be understood in the psychological 
conceptual framework. It might be claimed that it fits the context, since 
in Politics I.13 Aristotle discusses the relation of the rational and irrational 
part of the soul. Albeit this discussion does not directly relate to a different 
deliberative faculty in men and women. A differentiation of the rational 
and the rational part of the soul might indicate in what direction the special 
character of the deliberative faculty in women should be understood.
This line of interpretation in the psychological conceptual framework can 
be well supported by the passages from the History of Animals, in which 
the male’s and female’s psychological make-up are distinguished. Aristotle 
surveys the natural differences between male and female that characterize 
many animals including human beings, implying that these features cannot 
be applied only to animals, but also to human beings. Compared with the 
male, the female is incline to be softer, “more capable of learning (μαθη-
μα τικώτερον)”,͵ more attentive to nurturing the young, and of “more re-
tentive memory”, whereas also being less spirited, less courageous, less 
savage. Aristotle supplemented his observation by claiming that in com-
parison to the male the female is “more compassionate, more easily moved 
to tears”, “more jealous, more querulous”, “more difficult to rouse to 
5 HA 608a28.
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action” (HA 608a25–608b19), etc. Aristotle is fully aware that these are 
general tendencies, and that there are the exceptions, even in one and the 
same species, but these differences are only in degree (Arnhart 1994: 397).
From these comparisons, including other passages in Aristotle (e.g., PA 
661b33–4), the majority of scholars concluded that Aristotle, when claiming 
that the women’s deliberative capacity lacks authority, meant that women 
in general are easily and frequently overcome by their irrational forces, 
which prevents them to exercise their deliberative capacity properly and 
beneficially both for them and society as such. Presumably, that is what 
Aristotle has in mind, since it fits the psychological make-up of females, 
as it is described in the History of Animals that they are, in comparison to 
men, more compassionate, jealous, querulous and easily moved to tears. 
For being too emotional or not being able to control their emotions, it 
seems that women in general are naturally incapable of judging properly 
on public affairs, and accordingly, of making reasonable decisions. Thereby, 
it is important to stress that their weakness in deliberation is not caused, 
in Aristotle’s view, by their cognitive incapacities. He even stresses that 
women are ”more capable of learning”, and that they have “retentive 
memory”. So, he distinguishes here also between the cognitive and delib-
erative functions of reason.
This interpretation also raises many problems. To say that women cannot 
rule their emotions is an empirical generalization with lots of exceptions. 
Fortenbaugh (1977: 138-139) uses an example of Euripides’ Medea to 
illustrate this thesis. One may also utilize the counter-example of Homer’s 
Penelope, whose practical reasons was not overruled by emotions. More 
serious are the problems of philosophical character. If women in general 
are overcome by appetites, then, as Marguerite Deslauriers rightly objects, 
it would be difficult for Aristotle to distinguish them from weak willed 
persons. Furthermore, there are also men overruled by emotions like 
Homer’s Achilles, implying that the subjection to emotions cannot be a 
differentia specifica of women. In addition, Deslauriers objects to this 
kind of interpretation that if women are unable to control their irrational 
“forces” by their reason, then they cannot be virtuous.
4. Women, Phronesis and Virtues
I will argue that the above-discussed, prevailing interpretation elucidates 
what Aristotle presumably has in mind, although it makes his account of 
women and their rationality if not inconclusive, then indisputably prob-
lematic. The additional support for this kind of interpretation will be 
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provided. I will also attempt to prove that, even if this widespread line of 
interpretation is correct, it produces intricate problems for Aristotle regard-
ing the question of virtues in women. The aim of the last section of the paper 
is to point out how eventually some of these problems may be resolved.
Marguerite Deslauriers objects that the last line of interpretation does 
not have “textual authority” (Deslauriers: 223). The passages from the 
History of Animals, concerning Aristotle’s views of women’s natural tend-
encies of their psychological make-up, is the textual evidence for those 
who claim that women are inclined to be overruled by emotions, whereby 
weakening their deliberative faculty. Moreover, Aristotle’s remarks that 
women (608a10–19) have the natural inclination not to act, presumably 
are meant to indicate their frequent indecisiveness in making decisions. 
This inclination, in Aristotle’s view, makes women incapable to exercise 
political functions, which require that their participants should be quick, 
calm and very decisive in action.
These assumptions are supported by the passage in the Nicomachean 
ethics, where Aristotle discusses the situation, in which a man cannot be 
overruled by pleasure and pains, claiming that most men can “hold out 
against, when this is not due to heredity or disease like the softness with 
the kings of Scythians, or that witch distinguishes the female from the 
male” (NE 1150b14–16). From this sentence, one might infer the conclusion 
that, according to Aristotle, a certain moral attitude, for example, the lack 
of self-control, is under the influence of “a biological, gender-based dis-
position” (Bradshow 1991: 568). Referring to the inferior endurance and 
softness as the innate characteristics, I concur with Bradshow’s assump-
tion here that, “female sex as a whole suffers from some physiological 
weakness” (Bradshow 1991: 568). As, it has been shown, Aristotle utilizes 
this kind of argumentation, which is of bio-psychological rather than of 
sociological character, to generalize some of his observations of individual 
females to the female gender in general. This is, altogether, more than 
problematic at least due to the reason, with which Aristotle himself might 
concur, that there are some women, albeit rare and exceptional, who can 
act reasonably and decisively. It is certain that the prevailing opinions of 
his time influenced Aristotle’s views, but they are, according to the given 
textual evidence, grounded in what Aristotle really held about the female 
nature. This much seems to suggest that these views are for him not pure 
conventions; they are in fact supported by arguments.
Moreover, it seems that there is a contradiction between the claim about 
women’ s “physiological weakness”, i. e., their inability to control the 
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irrational “parts” of their soul by reason, and the attribution of virtues 
to them. It is, indeed, inconsistent to maintain that women cannot sub-
ject their irrational appetites and emotions, and to claim that they can 
be virtuous, which presupposes the acquirement of rational excellence. 
I will extend the principle of charity to Aristotle, in order to reconcile to 
some degree his apparently inconsistent views. One may reply to the 
assumed inconsistency in Aristotle by referring to Nicomachean Ethics 
1102b28–33, where Aristotle distinguishes reason and the “appetitive and 
in general the desiring element”, which is irrational, but can also be vir-
tuous by “obeying” reason. Since women have reason and a deliberative 
faculty, the inference might be drawn that the virtues of the irrational 
“part” of the soul should be subjected to the virtues of her own reason 
and deliberative faculty. Taking into account our previous discussion, 
and Aristotle’s general account of women, one may assert that women 
do not subject the virtues of the appetitive and desiring part of the soul 
to their own reason. Yet, due to the fact that women also “share in 
reason”,Ͷ they can obey, listen to reason, be cultivated and taught by 
reason. In order to acquire the virtues of some irrational parts of the soul, 
it seems obvious that women should teach, educate and guide the irra-
tional desires by reason. On the other hand, women in general have a 
natural inclination to be subjected to irrational appetites and emotions. 
This natural inclination, however, can be cultivated and educated, per-
mitting women to develop the virtues. In this context, obeying does not 
mean pure subjection, but the understanding of the reasons why such 
subjection is good and beneficial both for our irrational desires and for 
the functioning of the female’s soul as a whole.
Aristotle’s differentiation between the good understanding and phronesis,ͷ 
where the latter presupposes issuing commands, albeit both implying 
the accurate grasping of the things belonging to the practical realm, is 
comparable with the relation between the female and the male. Regardless 
of the advanced faculty of the accurate understanding even of the polit ical 
matters, the female is deprived of issuing commands. Aristotle might 
permit that women can command in the domain of the household, but 
6  Marguerite Deslauriers states that women and slaves “borrow” the practical ra-
tionality from free, rational men, which facilitates their becoming virtuous. Instead 
of this term, i.e., “borrow”, which might imply that what has been borrowed, has to 
be returned, I am more inclined to utilize terms such as “share in”, meaning that the 
irrational “parts” of our soul participate in reason. In this way, reason is present in all 
other virtues, although it manifests differently in men and women.
7  Bradshaw (1991) discusses in detail the relation between prudence (pronesis) and 
women’s issues.
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only under the control of their fathers or husbands, if they believe that 
her commands are reasonable, and if they allow them to be imposed 
upon the other members of the household.
When Aristotle discusses the subject-matter of education in the last two 
books of the Politics, he is exclusively concerned with the education of 
the citizen, and the good citizen is repeatedly identified with the good 
man. Nevertheless, in their families the women have the opportunity to 
have access to practical reason in their fathers, and later their husbands. 
Although women are dependent on the others and are not provided the 
opportunity to acquire a proper education, they are inclined to listen, 
understand the arguments of others and, consequently, to be taught how 
to behave rationally in their own right and domain. Therefore, women can 
be virtuous in so far as they can develop certain kind of virtues suitable 
to them, by subjecting themselves to teaching and the correct reasoning 
of free men.
If the phronesis, i.e., the rational, practical excellence, is the only arete 
peculiar to the natural ruler, then there is a problem concerning the at-
taining of virtues for the subjects, including women, since phronesis, 
according to Aristotle, is the condition for being virtuous. One of the 
replies to this serious, philosophical problem, concerning the attribution 
of the phronesis to all non-ruling individuals, might be that by partaking 
in the practical rationality, non-ruling individuals develop the virtues of 
their own. Despite the fact that women have reason, including a delib-
erative faculty, according to Aristotle, they are enabled to develop it to 
its “completeness”, i.e., to its full realization. Women can be moderate, 
generous, even courageous, but different from men not only in degree, 
but also in kind. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle gave examples of female char-
acter virtues: diligence (φιλεργία, literary “delight in hard work”) and 
moderation (σωφροσύνη), defined as “the virtue that disposes us to obey 
νόμος where physical pleasures are concerned” (Rht. 1366b14–15).
It seems that the lack of control either in the psychic make-up or the 
political organization prevents women from exercising their deliberative 
faculty to its full potential, i.e., to its full accomplishment. According to 
Aristotle, however, women, on one hand, can acquire virtues, but, on the 
other, in exercising their virtues, they are always do so under someone 
else’s “command”, either of their fathers or husbands or the prevailing 
customs of the society they live in. Therefore, according to him, women 
have virtues, but different in kind to men, which, among other things, 
means that they participate in reason to some degree. Consequently, 
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women can develop some virtues, appropriate to them, even to their full 
“completeness”, as in the case of the definition of feminine σωφροσύνη 
in the Rhetoric, but always under the guidance of someone else, i.e., male 
individuals or certain social and cultural customs.
5. Conclusion
Aristotle never disregarded the position of women in a society. Moreover, 
he criticizes a slavish treatment of women as a matter of brute strength and 
barbar ism. At Politics 1259b1, Aristotle even provides a telling analogy of 
the relation of the male and the female with the rule in the constitutional 
cities, where citizens are equal. In these cities, one holds an office when it 
is one’s turn. This simile indicated that the male and the female are, in fact, 
equal like the constitutional rule, although Aristotle never explains why it 
is never the woman’ s turn to rule in the household. Non ethe less, we can 
find in Aristotle places, where he provides a more positive view of the gender 
relations, although they are not detailed enough, or not systematically 
connected to overthrow the traditional interpretation of how Aristotle 
accounted for the female’s gender and its social and political role.
If Aristotle, does have in mind that women are seldom capable of ruling, 
since their deliberative faculty has been overcome by their irrational 
desires, appetites and emotions, then his thesis has serious social and 
political consequences. It follows that they should be governed by 
someone with a fully developed deliberative faculty, i.e., by their fathers 
or husbands, who possess the authority required for their preferably 
rational choices both in private and public affairs. Furthermore, it implies 
that they are fully excluded from public affairs, and they only have au-
thor ity within the household. Nevertheless, Aristotle asserts that wom-
en are even “more capable of teaching”, and have a deliberative faculty, 
facilitating their correct judgments about practical affairs. If their reason 
is capable of teaching, listening and understanding reasonable argu-
ments, which can lead women to better and deeper insights, one may 
rightly raise the question of why they are then incapable of developing 
the deliberative faculty which could have authority. Such a reply cannot 
be found in Aristotle.
In the most developed contemporary societies men and women are con-
stitutionally equal. Nonetheless, women’s deliberations are all too fre-
quently treated insufficiently recognized, as if they were less sound, 
reasonable, grounded, even sometimes as having no authority at all. The 
laws, which guarantee the equality of all citizens, are obligatory not 
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only for the equality of both genders, but also for the punishment of those 
who are breaking these laws. The lesson we can learn from Aristotle, 
concerning the issue of authority, is that all individuals, including women 
in our contemporary societies, should primarily perform and develop 
both their intellectual and character excellences to their complete ac-
complishment, if they want their deliberations to be accepted “with au-
thority”. It is, indeed, not the only, but the best way to “fight” against 
traditionally grounded constrains and prejudices of all kinds.͸
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Irina Deretić
Zašto ženska sposobnost rasuđivanja nema autoritet? 
Aristotel o političkoj ulozi žena
Rezime
U ovom ra du ras pra vlja ću o Ari sto te lo vim kon tro verz nim po gle di ma o že na ma. 
Kri tič ki ću pre i spi ta ti tri glav ne in ter pre ta ci je nje go ve tvrd nje da že ne ima ju 
spo sob nost ras uđi va nja, ali „bez auto ri te ta“. In ter pre ta to ri, ko ji spa da ju u 
pr vu gru pu tu ma ča ove tvrd nje, sma tra ju da je Ari sto tel pod ti me pod ra zu-
me vao da je žen ska ne spo sob nost da da je is prav ne sa ve te i do no si pra vil ne 
od lu ke pro u zro ko va na kon ven ci ja ma i obi ča ji ma vre me na u ko jem je ži veo. 
Na sto ja ću da uka žem na lo še stra ne ovog ti pa tu ma če nja. Na da lje, iz ne ću 
raz lo ge za što ni je uver lji va jed na od no vi jih in ter pre ta ci ja ko ju iz no si Mar ga ret 
De lo r je. Pre ma nje nom či ta nju, ne do sta tak auto ri te ta u žen skoj spo sob no sti 
ra su đi va nja ne zna či ni šta dru go do to da za da ci ma, nad ko ji ma že ne ima ju 
auto ri tet spro vo de se za rad za da ta ka nad ko ji ma mu škar ci ima ju auto ri te ta. 
Pre ma pre o vla đu ju ćem tu ma če nju, me đu znal ci ma an tič ke ba šti ne, Ari sto tel 
je sma trao da su že ne in fe ri or ne u od no su na mu škar ce, za to što isu vi še če sto 
bi va ju nad vla da ne ira ci o nal nim „si la ma“ svo je pri ro de. Ar gu men to va ću u 
pri log to ga da upra vo ova pre o vla đu ju ća in ter pre ta ci ja raz ja šnja va ono što je 
Ari sto tel naj ve ro vat ni je imao u vi du, prem da to či ni nje go vo shva ta nje že na 
i nji ho ve ra ci o nal no sti ako ne in konk lu ziv nim, on da neo spor no pro ble ma-
tič nim. Dru gim re či ma, na sto ja ću na po ka žem da uko li ko je pre o vla đu ju ći 
tip in ter pre ta ci je is pra van, ta kvo shva ta nje že na za Ari sto te la pro iz vo di ne ke 
fi lo zof ski „ne pre mo sti ve“ pro ble me. Cilj po sled njeg de la ovog ra da je ste da 
se uka že ka ko bi se ne ki od tih pro ble ma mo gli re ši ti.
Ključ ne re či: Ari sto tel, že ne, spo sob nost ra su đi vanja, do no še nje od lu ka, 
auto ri tet
